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(2016)	  	  	  Clara	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Animal–computer	  interaction:	  a	  manifesto1	  	  [Mancini,	  C.	  (2011).	  Animal-­‐Computer	  Interaction	  (ACI):	  a	  Manifesto.	  ACM	  Interactions,	  18(4),	  pp.	  69-­‐73.]	  Animals2	  have	  been	  involved	  in	  machine	  interactions	  for	  many	  decades.	  Skinner’s	  famous	  operant	  conditioning	  chamber,	  used	  in	  behavioral	  experiments	  since	  the	  early	  1930s,3	  provided	  output	  devices,	  such	  as	  lights	  or	  sounds,	  and	  input	  devices,	  such	  as	  levers	  or	  buttons,	  and	  would	  dispense	  food	  or	  water	  if,	  for	  example,	  a	  rat	  or	  a	  pigeon	  completed	  a	  given	  sequence	  of	  tasks	  correctly.	  These	  systems	  have	  gradually	  evolved	  into	  sophisticated	  computerized	  environments	  affording	  complex	  interactivity.	  Other	  interaction	  systems,	  such	  as	  computer	  games	  currently	  employed	  in	  more	  advanced	  primate	  cognition	  studies,	  provide,	  for	  example,	  on-­‐	  screen	  animations	  that	  can	  be	  controlled	  via	  joystick	  (Gill	  2011).	  	  Within	  agricultural	  engineering,	  interactive	  computing	  devices	  have	  also	  been	  developed,	  for	  example,	  to	  optimize	  milk	  production	  in	  the	  farming	  industry,	  with	  the	  introduction	  of	  the	  first	  automatic	  milking	  systems	  in	  dairy	  farms	  emerging	  in	  the	  early	  1990s	  (Rossing	  et	  al.	  1997).	  These	  systems	  have	  rapidly	  developed	  into	  cutting-­‐edge	  applications	  of	  pervasive	  and	  ubiquitous	  computing	  technology,	  enabling	  cows	  to	  independently	  engage	  in	  voluntary	  milking	  and	  express	  intelligent	  and	  social	  behavior	  never	  previously	  observed	  in	  constraining	  farming	  environments	  (Brennan	  2005).	  	  Examples	  of	  a	  different	  kind	  of	  interaction	  are	  provided	  by	  tracking	  and	  telemetric	  sensor	  devices,	  which	  have	  been	  used	  in	  conservation	  studies	  since	  the	  early	  1970s	  and	  which	  have	  now	  become	  commonplace.	  For	  example,	  radio	  collars	  allowed	  researchers	  to	  uncover	  the	  elusive	  behavior	  and	  territorial	  needs	  of	  snow	  leopards	  for	  the	  first	  time	  (Jackson	  and	  Ahlborn	  1989),	  and	  satellite	  collars	  enabled	  conservation	  efforts	  to	  start	  mapping	  the	  movements	  of	  elephants	  (Lindeque	  and	  Lindeque	  1991).	  Tracking	  devices	  have	  also	  been	  introduced	  to	  the	  pet	  market,	  while	  various	  telemetric	  technologies	  are	  used	  in	  laboratory	  settings	  to	  monitor,	  for	  example,	  dogs’	  physiological	  parameters	  during	  pre-­‐clinical	  trials	  (Emka	  Technologies	  n.d.).4	  	  In	  short,	  animal–computer	  interactions	  have	  a	  long	  history	  and	  can	  be	  found	  in	  many	  areas	  in	  which	  human	  activity	  involves	  other	  species.	  	  
The	  elephant	  in	  the	  room	  	  In	  spite	  of	  its	  history,	  the	  study	  of	  the	  interactions	  between	  animals	  and	  computing	  technology	  has	  never	  entered	  mainstream	  computer	  science,	  and	  the	  animal	  perspective	  has	  seldom	  informed	  the	  design	  of	  animal	  computing	  applications,	  whose	  development	  has	  so	  far	  been	  driven	  by	  academic	  disciplines	  other	  than	  computer	  science	  or	  by	  other	  industrial	  sectors.	  The	  design	  of	  these	  technologies	  remains	  fundamentally	  human	  cent[e]red,	  and	  the	  study	  of	  how	  they	  are	  adopted	  by	  or	  affect	  their	  users	  remains	  fundamentally	  outside	  the	  remit	  of	  user-­‐computer	  interaction	  research.	  	  The	  negative	  effects	  of	  this	  lack	  of	  animal	  perspective	  become	  obvious	  when,	  for	  example,	  the	  behaviour	  and	  welfare	  of	  seals	  fitted	  with	  bio-­‐logging	  tags	  and	  satellite	  transmitters	  are	  
significantly	  affected	  and	  data	  gathered	  during	  costly	  conservation	  studies	  risks	  invalidation	  (Hazekamp	  et	  al.	  2009),	  or	  when	  cows	  who	  do	  not	  engage	  with	  milking	  systems	  are	  culled	  and	  farmers	  suffer	  capital	  losses	  (Brennan	  2005).	  But	  risk	  mitigation	  aside,	  what	  about	  the	  things	  we	  could	  gain	  from	  a	  shift	  in	  perspective?	  What	  would	  it	  allow	  us	  to	  learn	  about	  and	  achieve	  with	  interactive	  technology?	  How	  would	  it	  influence	  our	  reflection	  on	  usability,	  adaptation,	  appropriation,	  methodology,	  and	  ethics,	  to	  name	  but	  a	  few	  aspects?	  Studies	  in	  interspecies	  computer	  interaction	  have	  started	  making	  appearances	  at	  HCI	  venues	  (Lee	  et	  al.	  2006,	  McGrath	  2009,	  Noz	  and	  An	  2011,	  Weilenmann	  and	  Juhlin	  2011),	  but	  the	  remarkably	  marginal	  position	  this	  research	  still	  occupies	  in	  the	  HCI	  community	  and	  its	  research	  agenda	  is	  an	  indicator	  that	  its	  significance	  has	  not	  yet	  been	  recognized.	  For	  some	  reason,	  animal–computer	  interaction	  (ACI)	  is,	  quite	  literally,	  the	  elephant	  in	  the	  room	  of	  user-­‐computer	  interaction	  research.	  The	  time	  has	  come	  to	  acknowledge	  the	  elephant,	  to	  start	  talking	  about	  ACI	  as	  a	  discipline	  in	  its	  own	  right,	  and	  to	  start	  working	  toward	  its	  systematic	  development.	  	  
The	  right	  moment	  	  Advances	  in	  our	  understanding	  of	  animal	  and	  comparative	  cognition,	  as	  well	  as	  those	  in	  computing	  technology,	  make	  the	  development	  of	  ACI	  as	  a	  discipline	  both	  possible	  and	  timely,	  while	  pressing	  environmental,	  economic,	  and	  cultural	  changes	  make	  it	  desirable.	  	  From	  long-­‐held	  training	  experiences,	  we	  know	  that	  several	  species	  can	  use	  interactive	  devices	  of	  one	  kind	  or	  another,	  sometimes	  appropriating	  them	  in	  interesting	  and	  unexpected	  ways.	  More	  generally,	  though,	  we	  now	  know	  that	  many	  species	  have	  sensory	  faculties	  superior	  to	  ours	  (Willis	  et	  al.	  2004),	  possess	  sophisticated	  cognitive	  abilities,	  engage	  in	  advanced	  problem	  solving,	  use	  purpose-­‐built	  tools	  for	  complex	  tasks	  (Emery	  and	  Clayton	  2004),	  communicate	  through	  articulated	  languages,	  experience	  a	  range	  of	  emotions,	  form	  complex	  social	  relation-­‐	  ships,	  make	  moral	  judgments	  (Bekoff	  2004),	  and	  hand	  down	  cultures	  through	  generations	  (Rendell	  and	  Whitehead	  2001).	  This	  has	  progressively	  made	  us	  more	  aware	  of	  the	  similarities	  between	  humans	  and	  other	  species,	  more	  appreciative	  of	  other	  species,	  and	  more	  attentive	  toward	  the	  significance	  of	  our	  relationships	  with	  them	  and	  the	  fragile	  environment	  we	  all	  share	  (Hurn	  2011).	  	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  interaction	  modes	  afforded	  by	  computing	  technology	  have	  expanded	  well	  beyond	  those	  provided	  by	  keyboard	  and	  mouse.	  Tangible,	  embodied,	  and	  proxemics	  interactions,	  for	  example,	  have	  brought	  physicality	  back	  into	  computing	  by	  engaging	  the	  whole	  body	  through	  contact	  and	  movement.	  Sensor	  technology	  has	  become	  more	  agile,	  robust,	  and	  sensitive,	  better	  able	  to	  read	  the	  changes	  coming	  from	  within	  and	  around	  us.	  In	  general,	  developments	  in	  pervasive,	  ubiquitous,	  and	  ambient	  computing	  are	  enabling	  technology	  to	  adapt	  to	  our	  spontaneous	  behaviours	  and	  to	  the	  contexts	  that	  these	  continuously	  produce	  and	  modify.	  Not	  only	  do	  these	  advances	  make	  computing	  technology	  more	  accessible	  to	  humans	  but	  they	  also	  make	  it	  far	  more	  accessible	  to	  other	  species.	  	  Aims	  and	  approach	  	  ACI	  aims	  to	  understand	  the	  interaction	  between	  animals	  and	  computing	  technology	  within	  the	  contexts	  in	  which	  animals	  habitually	  live,	  are	  active,	  and	  socialize	  with	  members	  of	  the	  same	  or	  other	  species,	  including	  humans.	  Contexts,	  activities,	  and	  relationships	  will	  differ	  considerably	  between	  species,	  and	  between	  wild,	  domestic,	  working,	  farm,	  or	  laboratory	  animals.	  In	  each	  particular	  case,	  the	  inter-­‐	  play	  between	  animal,	  technology,	  and	  contextual	  elements	  is	  of	  interest	  to	  the	  ACI	  researcher.	  	  ACI	  aims	  to	  influence	  the	  development	  of	  interactive	  technology	  to:	  	  
• improve	  animals’	  life	  expectancy	  and	  quality	  by	  facilitating	  the	  fulfilment	  of	  their	  physiological	  and	  psychological	  needs	  (technology	  that	  encourages	  healthy	  feeding	  habits	  in	  domestic	  animals	  or	  allows	  them	  to	  modify	  their	  housing	  conditions	  at	  leisure	  might	  be	  consistent	  with	  this	  aim);	  	  	  
• support	  animals	  in	  the	  legal	  functions	  in	  which	  they	  are	  involved	  by	  minimizing	  any	  
negative	  effects	  and	  maximizing	  any	  positive	  effects	  of	  those	  functions	  on	  the	  animals’	  life	  expectancy	  and	  quality	  (technology	  that	  gives	  farm	  animals	  control	  over	  the	  processes	  in	  which	  they	  are	  involved,	  produces	  no	  side	  effects	  on	  the	  animals	  involved	  in	  conservation	  studies,	  or	  helps	  working	  animals	  communicate	  with	  their	  assisted	  humans	  might	  be	  consistent	  with	  this	  aim);	  and	  	  	  
• foster	  the	  relationship	  between	  humans	  and	  animals	  by	  enabling	  communication	  and	  promoting	  understanding	  between	  them	  (technology	  that	  allows	  companion	  animals	  to	  play	  entertaining	  games	  with	  their	  guardians	  or	  enables	  guardians	  to	  understand	  and	  respond	  to	  the	  emotions	  of	  their	  companion	  animals	  might	  be	  consistent	  with	  this	  aim).	  	  ACI	  aims	  to	  develop	  a	  user	  cent[e]red	  approach,	  informed	  by	  the	  best	  available	  knowledge	  of	  animals’	  needs	  and	  preferences,	  to	  the	  design	  of	  technology	  meant	  for	  animal	  use.	  It	  also	  appropriately	  regards	  humans	  and	  other	  species	  alike	  as	  legitimate	  stakeholders	  throughout	  all	  the	  phases	  of	  the	  development	  process.	  	  	  
Ethical	  Principles	  
ACI:	  A	  manifesto	  57	  ACI	  takes	  a	  non-­‐speciesist	  approach	  to	  research	  (Dunayer	  2004),	  and	  researchers	  have	  a	  responsibility	  to:	  	  
• acknowledge	  and	  respect	  the	  characteristics	  of	  all	  species	  participating	  in	  the	  research	  without	  discriminating	  against	  any	  of	  them;	  	  	  
• treat	  both	  human	  and	  nonhuman	  participants	  as	  individuals	  equally	  deserving	  of	  consideration,	  respect,	  and	  care	  according	  to	  their	  needs;	  	  	  
• choose	  to	  work	  with	  a	  species	  only	  if	  the	  intent	  is	  to	  advance	  knowledge	  or	  develop	  technology	  that	  is	  beneficial	  or	  otherwise	  relevant	  to	  that	  particular	  species;	  	  	  
• protect	  both	  human	  and	  nonhuman	  participants	  from	  physiological	  or	  psychological	  harm	  at	  all	  times	  by	  employing	  research	  methods	  that	  are	  non-­‐	  invasive,	  non-­‐oppressive,	  and	  non-­‐depriving;	  	  	  
• afford	  both	  human	  and	  nonhuman	  participants	  the	  possibility	  to	  withdraw	  from	  the	  interaction	  at	  any	  time,	  either	  temporarily	  or	  permanently;	  and	  	  	  
• obtain	  informed	  consent	  to	  the	  involvement	  of	  both	  human	  and	  animal	  participants,	  either	  from	  the	  participants	  themselves	  (for	  example,	  for	  adult	  humans)	  or	  from	  those	  who	  are	  legally	  responsible	  for	  them	  (for	  animals).	  	  	  
Widespread	  benefits	  	  	  The	  development	  of	  ACI	  as	  a	  discipline	  could	  have	  many	  benefits	  for	  both	  animals	  and	  humans.	  For	  example,	  it	  could	  have	  important	  effects	  on	  our	  interspecies	  relationships	  by	  informing	  the	  design	  of	  technology	  that	  enables	  the	  animals	  we	  live	  and	  sometimes	  work	  with	  to	  effectively	  communicate	  with	  us,	  increase	  their	  participation	  in	  our	  interactions,	  and	  constructively	  influence	  our	  environments.	  These	  developments	  could	  give	  us	  a	  better	  understanding	  of	  those	  we	  share	  our	  lives	  with	  and	  help	  us	  build	  safer,	  richer,	  longer,	  and	  more	  productive	  relation-­‐	  ships	  with	  them.	  	  ACI	  could	  also	  lead	  to	  further	  insights	  into	  animal	  cognition	  –	  for	  example,	  by	  informing	  the	  design	  of	  interactive	  technology	  for	  behavioural	  studies	  that	  affords	  optimal	  usability	  and	  creative	  appropriation	  for	  the	  animals.	  Or	  it	  could	  support	  conservation	  efforts	  –	  for	  example,	  by	  informing	  the	  design	  of	  monitoring	  devices	  that	  minimize	  the	  impact	  on	  the	  animals	  while	  maximizing	  the	  quality	  and	  reliability	  of	  the	  data	  gathered	  through	  them.	  Moreover,	  ACI	  could	  improve	  the	  economic	  and	  ethical	  sustainability	  of	  food	  production	  –	  for	  example,	  by	  informing	  the	  design	  of	  technology	  that	  affords	  farm	  animals	  more	  freedom	  and	  autonomy,	  enabling	  them	  to	  live	  less	  unnatural	  lives,	  reducing	  their	  stress	  levels	  and	  susceptibility	  to	  illness	  without	  recourse	  to	  drugs,	  increasing	  their	  productivity,	  and	  improving	  the	  quality	  of	  their	  produce.	  	  Finally,	  ACI	  could	  expand	  the	  horizon	  of	  user-­‐computer	  interaction	  
research	  by	  pushing	  our	  imagination	  beyond	  the	  boundaries	  of	  human-­‐computer	  interaction.	  For	  example,	  it	  could	  help	  us	  discover	  new	  ways	  of	  eliciting	  requirements	  from	  those	  who	  cannot	  communicate	  with	  us	  through	  natural	  language	  or	  abstract	  concepts.	  It	  could	  help	  us	  explore	  new	  modes	  of	  interaction	  for	  those	  who	  do	  not	  have	  hands,	  cannot	  decipher	  the	  patterns	  emitted	  by	  a	  screen,	  or	  have	  limited	  attention	  spans.	  Or	  it	  could	  help	  us	  find	  new	  ways	  of	  understanding	  and	  evaluating	  the	  impact	  of	  technology	  on	  individuals	  and	  social	  groups	  –	  perhaps	  shedding	  new	  light	  on	  issues	  such	  as	  identity,	  privacy,	  or	  trust,	  and	  contributing	  to	  our	  understanding	  of	  what	  it	  means	  to	  be	  human	  and	  who	  we	  are	  in	  relation	  to	  other	  species.	  	  
A	  research	  agenda	  Of	  course,	  whether	  ACI	  can	  yield	  the	  benefits	  outlined	  above	  depends	  on	  our	  ability	  to	  tackle	  some	  challenging	  questions.	  For	  example,	  how	  do	  we	  elicit	  requirements	  from	  a	  nonhuman	  participant?	  How	  do	  we	  involve	  them	  in	  the	  design	  process?	  How	  do	  we	  evaluate	  the	  technology	  we	  develop	  for	  them?	  How	  do	  we	  investigate	  the	  interplay	  between	  nonhuman	  participants,	  technology,	  and	  contextual	  factors?	  In	  other	  words,	  how	  on	  Earth	  are	  we	  going	  to	  develop	  a	  user-­‐centered	  design	  process	  for	  animals?	  Here	  is	  a	  possible	  roadmap:	  	  
• First,	  we	  could	  look	  at	  what	  has	  been	  done	  in	  other	  areas,	  what	  knowledge	  about	  animal	  behavior	  and	  psychology	  is	  available,	  and	  what	  data	  has	  already	  been	  collected	  about	  animal-­‐computer	  interactions.	  We	  could	  look	  at	  how	  all	  that	  maps	  onto	  what	  we	  know	  about	  user-­‐computer	  interactions	  and	  how	  it	  might	  contribute	  to	  ACI	  as	  a	  discipline	  and	  design	  practice.	  	  	  
• Second,	  we	  could	  form	  collaborations	  with	  researchers	  from	  disciplines	  such	  as	  ethology,	  behavioral	  medicine,	  animal	  psychology,	  and	  veterinary,	  agricultural,	  and	  environmental	  engineering	  to	  help	  us	  with	  this	  mapping	  effort.	  Similarly,	  the	  expertise	  and	  experience	  of	  professionals	  and	  practitioners	  who	  work	  with	  animals	  in	  environments	  where	  animal-­‐	  computer	  interactions	  take	  place	  would	  be	  important.	  	  	  
• Third,	  we	  could	  study	  in-­‐the-­‐wild	  cases	  of	  whatever	  technology	  is	  already	  in	  use	  or	  might	  be	  developed	  in	  order	  to	  understand	  those	  domains	  and	  contexts,	  their	  users	  and	  stakeholders,	  so	  that	  we	  can	  begin	  to	  develop	  or	  adapt	  relevant	  ACI	  concepts	  and	  models.	  	  	  
• Fourth,	  we	  could	  look	  at	  human-­‐centered	  interaction	  design	  protocols	  and	  methods	  in	  order	  to	  assess	  which	  ones	  may	  or	  may	  not	  be	  relevant	  to	  an	  animal-­‐centered	  design	  process,	  which	  might	  be	  adapted,	  which	  might	  be	  borrowed	  from	  other	  disciplines,	  and	  which	  might	  need	  to	  be	  developed	  from	  scratch.	  	  	  
• Fifth,	  we	  could	  start	  adapting,	  developing,	  and	  integrating	  animal-­‐centered	  interaction	  design	  protocols	  and	  methods—for	  example,	  for	  requirements	  elicitation,	  participatory	  design,	  and	  contextual	  evaluation,	  in	  a	  loop	  between	  empirical	  work	  and	  theoretical	  reflection.	  	  	  
• Sixth,	  we	  could	  start	  developing	  theoretical	  models	  of	  animal-­‐computer	  interaction,	  which	  would	  then	  drive	  further	  research.	  These	  would	  take	  into	  account	  pre-­‐ACI	  research	  on	  animals	  and	  would	  be	  informed	  by	  ACI	  empirical	  research	  with	  animals.	  	  	  
An	  Invitation	  	  	  Because	  of	  the	  questions	  it	  raises	  and	  the	  challenges	  it	  poses,	  ACI	  is	  arguably	  the	  next	  frontier	  in	  the	  study	  and	  development	  of	  interactive	  technology.	  Those	  who	  are	  keen	  on	  joining	  in	  the	  exploration	  of	  this	  new	  territory	  are	  warmly	  invited	  to	  sign	  the	  ACI	  Manifesto	  and	  join	  our	  animal-­‐computer	  interaction	  group	  at:	  http://www.open.ac.uk/blogs/ACI/	  ****	  	  
	  
Selection	  from	  ‘towards	  an	  animal-­‐centered	  ethics	  for	  animal–computer	  
interaction’5	  	  	  [Mancini,	  C.	  (2016).	  Towards	  an	  Animal-­‐Centred	  Ethics	  for	  Animal-­‐Computer	  Interaction.	  In	  Mancini,	  C.,	  Juhlin,	  O.,	  Lawson,	  S.	  (Eds),	  Special	  Issue	  on	  Animal-­‐Computer	  Interaction,	  
International	  Journal	  of	  Human	  Computer	  Studies,	  IJHCS,	  Vol.	  98,	  Feb	  2017,	  pp.	  221-­‐233.]	  	  
Ethical	  implications	  of	  user-­‐centered	  design	  for	  and	  with	  animals	  	  In	  contrast	  to	  the	  above,	  I	  argue	  that,	  in	  order	  to	  be	  consistent	  with	  a	  user-­‐centered	  perspective,	  ACI’s	  ethical	  approach	  to	  research	  needs	  to	  meet	  different	  criteria.	  First,	  it	  is	  not	  the	  animal	  characteristics	  that	  provide	  grounds	  for	  their	  treatment	  but	  rather	  their	  role	  as	  users	  and	  research	  participants.	  Thus,	  giving	  all	  animals	  involved	  in	  ACI	  research	  equal	  protection	  and	  care	  (according	  to	  their	  individual	  needs)	  is	  the	  most	  appropriate	  way	  to	  ensure	  that	  their	  requirements	  as	  users	  can	  emerge	  during	  the	  process	  and	  can	  therefore	  be	  designed	  for	  with	  their	  active	  participation.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  precisely	  because	  user	  characteristics	  are	  so	  central	  to	  the	  design	  process,	  animals	  cannot	  be	  viewed	  as	  the	  substitutable	  components	  of	  an	  experimental	  set-­‐	  up.	  Therefore,	  it	  is	  only	  appropriate	  to	  involve	  an	  animal	  in	  research	  if	  this	  is	  directly	  relevant	  to	  them.	  Furthermore,	  if	  one	  recognizes	  that	  maintaining	  good	  welfare	  at	  all	  times	  is	  an	  important	  individual	  requirement,	  in	  order	  to	  be	  consistent	  with	  user-­‐	  centered	  design	  ACI	  research	  needs	  to	  be	  compatible	  with	  the	  welfare	  of	  both	  end	  users	  and	  research	  participants.	  Protecting	  the	  welfare	  of	  animals	  used	  in	  research	  is	  the	  aim	  of	  related	  institutional	  directives,	  protocols	  and	  guidelines.	  But	  what	  are	  the	  specific	  implications	  of	  ACI’s	  animal-­‐centered	  perspective	  in	  this	  regard?	  	  
A	  welfare-­‐centred	  ethics	  What	  constitutes	  good	  welfare	  for	  animals	  is	  the	  object	  of	  on-­‐going	  research	  (Fraser	  et	  al.	  1997,	  Fraser	  2008)	  some	  notions	  of	  animal	  welfare	  assuming	  more	  than	  others	  that	  animals	  are	  capable	  of	  conscious	  and	  sentient	  experience.	  Because	  it	  bypasses	  the	  thorny	  issue	  of	  consciousness	  and	  sentience,	  and	  is	  there-­‐	  fore	  relevant	  to	  all	  animals,	  the	  notion	  of	  welfare	  proposed	  by	  Stamp	  Dawkins	  (2012)	  is	  particularly	  useful	  here.	  For	  Stamp	  Dawkins,	  animal	  welfare	  presupposes	  the	  fulfilment	  of	  two	  fundamental	  conditions:	  That	  an	  animal	  is	  healthy	  and	  that	  they	  have	  what	  they	  want.	  The	  author’s	  rationale	  is	  that	  animals	  have	  evolved	  adaptations	  for	  coping	  with	  environmental	  conditions	  (e.g.	  a	  thick	  coat),	  for	  exploiting	  available	  resources	  (e.g.	  specific	  hunting	  techniques	  or	  a	  specialized	  digestive	  system)	  and	  for	  recovering	  from	  injury	  (e.g.	  mounting	  an	  immune	  response),	  in	  order	  to	  maintain	  good	  health	  thus	  maximizing	  their	  chances	  of	  survival	  and	  reproduction.	  However,	  [as]	  Stamp	  Dawkins	  points	  out,	  animals	  have	  also	  evolved	  adaptations	  for	  preventing	  the	  occurrence	  of	  conditions	  that	  could	  compromise	  their	  survival	  in	  the	  first	  place,	  adaptations	  which	  result	  in	  the	  animals	  wanting	  certain	  things:	  for	  example,	  wanting	  to	  search	  for	  prey	  that	  might	  be	  hiding	  in	  the	  ground,	  or	  wanting	  to	  burrow	  to	  hide	  from	  potential	  predators.	  For	  Stamp	  Dawkins,	  the	  animal	  being	  healthy	  and	  having	  what	  they	  want	  are	  inter-­‐	  dependent	  conditions	  or	  requirements	  (e.g.	  a	  captive	  animal	  whose	  exploratory	  behavior	  is	  constantly	  frustrated	  may	  develop	  harmful	  stereotypies)	  which	  need	  to	  be	  satisfied	  at	  the	  same	  time	  (e.g.	  giving	  an	  animal	  free	  access	  to	  food	  needs	  to	  be	  compatible	  with	  maintaining	  their	  optimal	  weight).	  If	  only	  one	  of	  the	  two	  conditions	  is	  satisfied,	  welfare	  is	  compromised.	  	  It	  follows	  that	  ACI	  research	  should	  never	  threaten	  the	  health	  of	  the	  animals	  involved	  and	  never	  deny	  them	  what	  they	  want,	  unless	  denying	  or	  limiting	  what	  they	  want	  is	  necessary	  to	  preserve	  their	  health.	  More	  specifically,	  the	  welfare	  requirement	  that	  an	  animal	  is	  healthy	  means	  that	  ACI	  
research	  should	  never	  entail	  practices	  or	  procedures	  that	  interfere	  with	  the	  evolutionary	  adaptations	  that	  sup-­‐	  port	  the	  animal’s	  health	  (e.g.	  through	  genetic	  manipulations),	  or	  threaten	  the	  animal’s	  health	  by	  compromising	  their	  physiological	  or	  psychological	  integrity	  (e.g.	  through	  invasive,	  aversive,	  or	  otherwise	  injurious	  manipulations).	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  welfare	  requirement	  that	  animals	  have	  what	  they	  want	  means	  that	  ACI	  research	  should	  never	  entail	  practices	  or	  procedures	  which	  prevent	  animals	  from	  expressing	  spontaneous	  behavior	  (e.g.	  through	  restriction	  or	  constriction),	  or	  con-­‐	  fine	  animals	  within	  settings	  that	  are	  not	  those	  for	  which	  they	  have	  evolved	  (e.g.	  through	  caging).	  The	  only	  cases	  in	  which	  such	  practices	  or	  procedures	  would	  ever	  be	  appropriate	  in	  connection	  with	  ACI	  research	  is	  in	  the	  unlikely	  event	  that	  they	  needed	  to	  be	  carried	  out	  for	  the	  direct	  benefit	  of	  the	  individual	  animal	  in	  question	  (e.g.	  through	  therapeutic	  surgery	  or	  confinement).	  	  Stamp	  Dawkins	  (2012)	  notes	  how	  generally	  the	  death	  of	  an	  animal	  is	  not	  in	  itself	  considered	  a	  welfare	  issue	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  a	  dead	  animal	  cannot	  suffer,	  from	  which	  would	  follow	  that	  the	  killing	  of	  an	  animal	  upon	  completion	  of	  a	  research	  procedure,	  an	  accepted	  practice	  by	  current	  legislation,	  does	  not	  impact	  on	  their	  welfare	  unless	  it	  causes	  the	  animal	  to	  suffer	  in	  the	  process.	  However,	  such	  a	  position	  seems	  to	  be	  at	  odds	  with	  the	  very	  evolutionary	  definition	  of	  animal	  welfare.	  If	  an	  animal	  has	  evolved	  certain	  adaptations	  precisely	  because	  these	  allow	  him	  to	  stay	  alive,	  and	  if	  violations	  to	  the	  animal’s	  adaptations	  impact	  on	  his	  welfare,	  then	  interventions	  that	  lead	  to	  the	  animal’s	  death	  arguably	  pose	  a	  welfare	  issue	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  they	  are	  incompatible	  with	  the	  very	  function	  that	  has	  allowed	  those	  adaptations	  to	  evolve.	  Bekoff	  (2010)	  argues	  how	  the	  struggle	  of	  an	  animal	  who	  is	  under	  attack	  indicates	  that	  his	  life	  matters	  to	  him;	  this	  point	  is	  arguably	  valid	  whether	  the	  animal	  is	  or	  is	  not	  aware	  of	  the	  attack,	  or	  even	  whether	  he	  is	  or	  is	  not	  aware	  of	  being	  alive.	  As	  Stamp	  Dawkins	  (2012)	  points	  out,	  struggling	  (e.g.	  to	  break	  free	  from	  confinement)	  is	  an	  evolutionary	  adaptation	  ultimately	  aimed	  at	  keeping	  the	  animal	  alive	  and	  well.	  Whether	  the	  threat	  to	  an	  animal’s	  life	  is	  delivered	  overtly	  in	  a	  form	  that	  the	  animal	  is	  able	  to	  recognize	  as	  a	  threat	  (e.g.	  strangulation)	  and	  thus	  respond	  to	  (e.g.	  struggling),	  or	  covertly	  in	  a	  form	  that	  the	  animal	  is	  unable	  to	  recognize	  (e.g.	  lethal	  injection	  during	  sedation)	  and	  thus	  respond	  to	  (e.g.	  hiding),	  the	  fact	  remains	  that	  such	  a	  threat	  opposes	  the	  very	  function	  of	  the	  animal’s	  life-­‐preserving	  adaptations.	  In	  this	  respect,	  it	  could	  be	  argued	  that	  killing	  can	  never	  be	  compatible	  with	  animal	  welfare,	  except	  when	  the	  mechanisms	  whose	  function	  is	  to	  keep	  the	  animal	  alive	  and	  well	  are	  so	  irretrievably	  compromised	  (e.g.	  because	  of	  illness)	  that	  there	  is	  no	  hope	  for	  his	  health	  and	  contentment	  to	  be	  restored	  to	  balance.	  Thus,	  on	  welfare	  grounds,	  the	  killing	  of	  participating	  animals	  at	  the	  end	  of	  research	  procedures	  is	  incompatible	  with	  ACI’s	  animal-­‐centered	  perspective.	  	  Instead,	  consistent	  with	  Stamp	  Dawkins’	  definition	  of	  welfare	  (2012)	  researchers	  should	  always	  endeavor	  to	  respect	  the	  animal’s	  identity	  and	  safeguard	  her	  integrity,	  both	  physiological	  and	  psychological,	  at	  all	  times.	  This	  means	  that	  researchers	  should	  work	  in	  contexts	  that	  are	  habitual	  for	  and	  thus	  familiar	  to	  the	  animal;	  they	  should	  endeavor	  to	  be	  as	  unobtrusive	  and	  undisruptive	  of	  the	  animal’s	  daily	  life	  patterns	  and	  routines	  as	  possible;	  they	  should	  give	  the	  animal	  space	  for	  expression	  and	  control	  over	  the	  research	  process;	  and	  they	  should	  use	  only	  forms	  of	  interaction	  which	  are	  respectful	  of	  and	  responsive	  to	  the	  animal’s	  needs	  and	  wants	  at	  all	  times.	  In	  animal-­‐centered	  research,	  the	  interests	  of	  individual	  participants	  should	  ‘prevail	  over	  the	  interests	  of	  science	  and	  society,	  where	  there	  is	  conflict’	  (Medical	  Research	  Council	  2004)	  and	  any	  potential	  risks	  to	  individual	  participants	  should	  outweigh	  any	  potential	  benefit	  to	  others.	  Therefore	  any	  cost-­‐benefit	  analysis	  of	  the	  research	  should	  be	  carried	  out	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  what,	  at	  the	  best	  of	  the	  researchers’	  knowledge,	  are	  the	  animal’s	  best	  interests.	  In	  user-­‐centered	  design	  this	  is	  both	  and	  ethical	  imperative,	  as	  recognized	  by	  ethics	  frameworks	  regulating	  the	  involvement	  of	  humans	  in	  HCI	  research	  (Association	  for	  Computing	  Machinery	  1992)	  and	  a	  methodological	  necessity,	  as	  argued	  by	  Ritvo	  and	  Allison	  in	  their	  discussion	  of	  research	  methodologies	  applicable	  to	  ACI	  (Ritvo	  and	  Allison	  2014).	  But	  how	  can	  researchers	  ensure	  that,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  animals,	  the	  interests	  and	  requirements	  of	  users	  and	  research	  participants	  are	  appropriately	  represented	  and	  thus	  prioritized?	  	  
	  
The	  issue	  of	  consent	  	  Existing	  frameworks	  motivate	  the	  need	  to	  minimize	  the	  impact	  of	  research	  procedures	  on	  the	  welfare	  of	  the	  animals	  involved,	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  they	  are	  capable	  of	  suffering	  whilst	  being	  incapable	  of	  consenting.	  This	  implies	  the	  ability	  to	  comprehend	  the	  immediate	  and	  wider	  implications	  of	  one’s	  involvement	  (Faden	  and	  Beauchamp	  1986),	  but	  of	  course	  interspecies	  cognitive	  differences	  and	  communication	  barriers	  make	  conveying	  the	  welfare	  implications	  of	  a	  research	  procedure	  to	  other	  animals	  practically	  impossible.	  Nevertheless,	  consent	  arguably	  marks	  an	  important	  difference	  between	  participation	  and	  subjection,	  thus	  in	  user-­‐centered	  research	  the	  animals’	  consent	  needs	  to	  somehow	  be	  sought.	  	  Of	  course,	  one	  approach	  to	  the	  issue	  is	  seeking	  consent	  for	  animals	  via	  media-­‐	  tors	  who	  are	  capable	  of	  comprehending	  the	  implications	  of	  the	  research	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  animals’	  welfare	  requirements	  and	  who	  have	  the	  legal	  authority	  to	  consent	  on	  their	  behalf.	  To	  ensure	  that	  consent	  is	  provided	  from	  a	  user-­‐centered	  perspective,	  such	  agents	  should	  also	  have	  a	  vested	  interest	  in	  prioritizing	  the	  welfare	  of	  the	  animals	  concerned.	  Furthermore,	  since	  in	  user-­‐centered	  research	  participants	  are	  not	  merely	  representatives	  of	  a	  category	  or	  substitutable	  components	  of	  an	  experimental	  apparatus	  but	  individuals,	  consent	  should	  to	  be	  sought	  on	  an	  individual	  basis.	  In	  this	  regard,	  Mancini	  et	  al.	  (2012)	  highlighted	  the	  complementary	  role	  of	  the	  animals’	  daily	  carers,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  animal	  welfare	  experts,	  on	  the	  other	  hand:	  The	  former	  hold	  critical	  contextual	  knowledge	  about	  an	  individual’s	  characteristic	  patterns	  and	  circumstances,	  while	  the	  latter	  hold	  essential	  expertise	  to	  assess	  those	  characteristic	  patterns	  and	  circumstances	  in	  relation	  to	  established	  animal	  welfare	  knowledge	  (Väätäjä	  and	  Pesonen	  2013).	  Thus,	  overall	  mediated	  consent	  should	  imply	  the	  following:	  	  
• the	  capacity	  to	  comprehend	  the	  immediate	  and	  wider	  welfare	  implications	  of	  a	  procedure,	  	  	  
• a	  vested	  interest	  in	  prioritizing	  the	  welfare	  of	  individual	  animals,	  	  	  
• familiarity	  with	  the	  individual’s	  characteristic	  patterns	  and	  circumstances,	  	  	  
• animal	  welfare	  expertise	  relevant	  to	  the	  individual,	  and	  	  	  
• the	  legal	  authority	  to	  consent	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  animal.	  	  	  Whether	  all	  or	  part	  of	  these	  competences	  are	  distributed	  across	  different	  individuals	  (e.g.	  the	  animal’s	  human	  companion	  who	  is	  also	  her	  legal	  guardian	  and	  an	  independent	  animal	  welfare	  expert)	  or	  are	  found	  within	  one	  individual	  (e.g.	  if	  the	  human	  companion	  and	  legal	  guardian	  is	  also	  an	  animal	  welfare	  expert),	  they	  should	  all	  be	  represented	  in	  the	  consenting	  process.	  Additionally,	  an	  independent	  authority,	  such	  as	  the	  animal	  welfare	  review	  bodies	  envisaged	  by	  the	  European	  Directive,	  should	  ensure	  that	  the	  above	  conditions	  are	  met	  in	  compliance	  with	  ACI’s	  research	  ethics	  framework	  as	  well	  as	  existing	  legislation.	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  voluntary	  engagement	  is	  a	  fundamental	  aspect	  of	  con-­‐	  sent	  (Faden	  and	  Beauchamp	  1986);	  however,	  clearly	  it	  would	  not	  be	  realistic	  to	  assume	  that	  mediators	  know	  what	  the	  animal	  they	  represent	  wants	  in	  specific	  contingencies.	  Thus	  mediation	  does	  not	  eliminate	  the	  need	  to	  obtain	  some	  form	  of	  contingent	  consent	  from	  the	  animals	  themselves.	  While	  animals	  might	  not	  be	  able	  to	  assess	  the	  welfare	  or	  wider	  implications	  of	  a	  procedure,	  they	  are	  nevertheless	  able	  to	  respond	  to	  specific	  conditions	  (Stamp	  Dawkins	  2012),	  provided	  they	  are	  afforded	  the	  freedom	  to	  make	  relevant	  choices,	  including	  the	  choice	  not	  to	  engage	  or	  withdraw	  altogether.	  Ritvo	  and	  Allison	  (2014)	  propose	  that	  participant-­‐	  controlled	  procedures	  are	  best	  suited	  to	  enable	  animals’	  preferences	  to	  emerge	  in	  ACI	  research;	  these	  may	  entail	  dichotomous-­‐choice	  protocols,	  whereby	  participants	  choose	  whether	  or	  not	  to	  be	  exposed	  to	  a	  stimulus,	  or	  multi-­‐stimulus	  protocols,	  whereby	  participants	  can	  choose	  between	  different	  stimuli	  as	  well	  as	  the	  length	  of	  stimulus	  exposure.	  If	  a	  participant	  is	  enabled	  to	  choose	  the	  pace	  and	  modality	  of	  their	  engagement	  with,	  or	  withdrawal	  from,	  the	  research	  process	  at	  any	  time,	  
then	  their	  response	  can	  provide	  a	  measure	  of	  their	  consent	  to	  engaging	  with	  a	  specific	  research	  set-­‐up.	  Of	  course,	  any	  contextual	  variations	  during	  a	  procedure	  might	  affect	  the	  participant’s	  assessment	  of	  the	  situation	  and	  thus	  their	  amenability	  to	  participate,	  so	  whether	  participants	  are	  able	  to	  assess	  the	  situation	  is	  an	  important	  consideration.	  	  Luger	  and	  Rodden	  (2013)	  argue	  that,	  as	  ubiquitous	  computing	  systems	  become	  more	  complex	  and	  seamless,	  and	  support	  an	  increasing	  range	  of	  daily	  activities,	  the	  data	  that	  drives	  their	  functionalities	  is	  increasingly	  abstracted	  from	  its	  original	  context;	  this	  makes	  it	  impossible	  for	  (human)	  users	  to	  understand	  the	  implications	  of	  their	  interactions	  with	  such	  systems	  and	  thus	  provide	  informed	  consent	  to	  the	  use	  of	  data	  they	  divulge	  during	  the	  course	  of	  those	  interactions.	  In	  this	  respect,	  the	  authors	  emphasize	  the	  dynamic	  nature	  of	  consent	  and	  the	  importance	  of	  enabling	  effective	  withdrawal	  at	  any	  time;	  they	  also	  stress	  the	  importance	  of	  giving	  users	  visibility	  over	  data	  flows	  within	  systems	  and	  the	  ability	  to	  easily	  interrogate	  the	  system	  to	  evaluate	  the	  cost-­‐benefit	  trade-­‐offs	  of	  engaging	  or	  withdrawing.	  In	  a	  more	  concrete	  sense,	  these	  are	  similarly	  useful	  considerations	  when	  designing	  ACI	  research	  procedures.	  Thus,	  overall	  contingent	  consent	  should	  imply	  the	  following:	  	  
• procedural	  set-­‐ups	  that	  enable	  the	  animal	  to	  assess	  the	  situation	  as	  much	  as	  possible	  (e.g.	  allowing	  the	  animal	  to	  freely	  explore	  his	  surroundings	  or	  any	  research	  equipment	  as	  appropriate	  prior	  to	  starting	  a	  procedure,	  and	  at	  regular	  intervals	  during	  the	  procedure),	  	  	  
• opportunities	  for	  the	  animal	  to	  make	  relevant	  choices	  between	  alternative	  forms	  of	  engagement	  (e.g.	  between	  different	  forms	  of	  input	  or	  output	  in	  an	  interface;	  between	  reward	  mechanisms	  based	  on	  food	  or	  play),	  and	  	  	  
• the	  possibility	  for	  the	  animal	  to	  effectively	  withdraw	  or	  withhold	  engagement	  (e.g.	  plenty	  of	  escape	  routes	  or	  rest	  corners	  as	  appropriate).	  	  	  Importantly,	  in	  order	  to	  monitor	  levels	  of	  consent	  over	  time,	  researchers	  should	  be	  able	  to	  continually	  and	  expertly	  monitor	  variations	  in	  the	  participant’s	  response	  to	  a	  procedure	  against	  their	  welfare	  requirements,	  as	  highlighted	  by	  Väätäjä	  and	  Pesonen	  (2013),	  and	  dynamically	  and	  promptly	  make	  any	  appropriate	  adjustments,	  including	  suspending	  a	  procedure.	  	  Researchers	  who	  work	  with	  non-­‐competent	  or	  non-­‐linguistic	  humans	  (Medical	  Research	  Council	  2004,	  2007)	  are	  well	  familiar	  with	  notions	  of	  mediated	  and	  contingent	  consent,	  its	  dynamic	  and	  transient	  nature	  (e.g.	  consent	  as	  a	  process	  rather	  than	  as	  a	  one-­‐off	  occurrence	  [Medical	  Research	  Council	  2007]),	  and	  the	  critical	  importance	  of	  monitoring	  and	  responding	  to	  signs	  of	  dissent	  (e.g.	  a	  young	  child	  becoming	  upset	  [Medical	  Research	  Council	  2004]).	  They	  are	  also	  aware	  of	  the	  necessary	  complementarity	  of	  the	  two	  forms	  of	  consent	  (Medical	  Research	  Council	  2004,	  2007),	  whereby	  those	  who	  can	  see	  the	  wider	  implications	  of	  a	  participant’s	  involvement	  lend	  their	  insight	  in	  the	  participant’s	  best	  interest,	  while	  the	  participant	  themselves	  is	  the	  only	  one	  who	  can	  assess	  the	  contingent,	  directly	  experiential	  implications.	  Consistent	  with	  the	  implications	  of	  user-­‐	  centered	  research,	  the	  very	  ethical	  perspective	  underpinning	  these	  notions	  is	  just	  as	  relevant	  here.	  	  
Notes	  	  1	  	  I	  am	  indebted	  to	  Yvonne	  Rogers,	  Bashar	  Nuseibeh,	  Marian	  Petre,	  Anne	  De	  Roeck,	  Hugh	  Robinson,	  Janet	  van	  der	  Linden,	  Richard	  Power,	  Shailey	  Minocha,	  Sandra	  Wil-­‐	  liams,	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  Lawson,	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  Sharp,	  and	  Simon	  Buckingham	  Shum	  for	  their	  constructive	  criticism	  and	  support.	  This	  work	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  supported	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  2	  	  The	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  animal(s)	  is	  loosely	  used	  throughout	  to	  refer	  to	  nonhuman	  animals.	  	  	  3	  	  Operant	  conditioning	  chamber;	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  chamber	  	  	  
4	  	  [Since	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  [Accessed	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  May	  2016]	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  a	  more	  up	  to	  date	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  McConway	  for	  his	  many	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  on	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  drafts,	  to	  Duncan	  Banks	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  his	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  and	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  Derek	  Matravers	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  encouragement.	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  Massaro	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